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Abstract
Cohen et al. (2013) measure a firm’s ability at investing in knowledge capital, a type of
intangible capital, through a model that captures how well a firm translates R&D intensity into
future sales growth. Using this model, they show that an investment portfolio comprised of firms
that have high R&D spending ability and high R&D intensity earn significant positive abnormal
returns. I modify their model to capture a broader investment in intangible capital by replacing
R&D intensity with SG&A intensity and substituting sales growth with gross profit growth. My
measure of ability at investing in intangible capital has two main advantages over Cohen et al.’s
(2013) measure. The first advantage is that it can be applied to a larger sample of firms. This is
because current US accounting standards give firms discretion over how they report their R&D
spending – a proxy for investments in knowledge capital – so many firms do not report this expense
separately from SG&A despite evidence of intangible capital creation. The second advantage of
my model is that it considers the simple fact that investments can result in revenue generation
and/or cost savings, both of which are valuable to a firm. Cohen et al.’s (2013) measure depends
on sales growth, so it does not consider firms that are successful at converting intangible capital
investments into cost savings. In performing a calendar-time portfolio analysis using my SG&A
spending ability measure, I find strong evidence that, on average, firms that have a track record at
effectively investing in intangible capital (demonstrate a high ability while also investing heavily
in this area) experience positive abnormal returns. Namely, an equal-weighted long portfolio
strategy that invests in firms that score in the top quintile of effectiveness has four- and five-factor
alphas (using the factors suggested by Carhart 1997 and Fama and French 2016) of 68 (t = 4.023,
p < 0.001) and 68 basis points per month (t = 3.868, p < 0.001), respectively, which both translate
to annual abnormal returns of roughly 8.5%. I also construct a version of my ability measure that
depends on sales growth, instead of gross profit growth and find that this specification is not a
strong predictor of abnormal returns. Lastly, I perform two additional calendar-time portfolio
analyses, sorting firms into portfolios by R&D intensity and Cohen et al.’s (2013) original measure
of R&D spending ability as well as a modified ability measure that depends on gross profit growth.
I find that I am unable to replicate Cohen et al.’s (2013) findings using an updated sample.
Additionally, I find that portfolios sorted on an R&D spending ability measure that depends on
gross profit growth produce abnormal returns. However, because these portfolios have a small
number of stocks these abnormal returns could be due to firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks.

Github data and code repository is available at https://github.com/dustin-lind/Senior-Thesis
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1 Introduction
In an efficient market, stock prices fully incorporate the value of a firm’s intangible assets.
Thus, investments in intangible capital should not be associated with future abnormal stock returns.
However, there is a growing body of literature, which I summarize below, that highlights the
market’s inability to properly value firms’ investments in intangible capital. In this paper, I build
on this literature by modifying Cohen et al.’s (2013) model for measuring a firm’s R&D spending
ability. R&D is widely recognized as a proxy for the amount that a firm spends on a type of
intangible capital known as knowledge capital. Cohen et al.’s (2013) ability measure captures how
well a firm’s past R&D spending intensity translates into future sales growth. After sorting firms
into portfolios based on their R&D spending ability and R&D spending relative to sales (“R&D
intensity”), Cohen et al. (2013) perform a calendar-time portfolio analysis. Their results indicate
that over their 1980 to 2009 sample period, firms that have a high R&D spending ability estimate
and a high R&D intensity earn significant positive abnormal returns. Namely, an equal- and valueweighted portfolio of firms that have high R&D spending ability and high R&D intensity earn
four-factor alphas (using the factors suggested by Carhart 1997) of 90 (t = 3.11) and 78 basis points
per month (t = 2.27), respectively. This translates to annual abnormal returns of 11% and 9.8%.
Cohen et al.’s (2013) model for measuring R&D spending ability suffers from two major
shortcomings. First, their model is designed such that to compute an ability score for a firm in their
sample, they must omit those that do not report R&D spending despite evidence of intangible
capital creation. Previous literature (see Koh and Reeb 2015) find that a substantial number of
firms don’t report R&D spending despite filing patents. For this reason, I develop a broader
measure of ability at investing in intangible capital based on SG&A spending, which is recognized
in economic literature as a proxy for the total amount that a firm invests in intangible capital. Also,
4

SG&A is an expense that virtually every firm reports. I find that of the 21,000+ firms with common
stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ over the past 40 years, almost 90% report
SG&A spending in a given year. Only 54% of these firms report R&D spending. I demonstrate
that my new measure based on SG&A spending can be applied to a larger sample of firms than
was possible in Cohen et al.’s (2013) study. This availability of data allows me to increase my
sample size and minimize the risk of filtering my sample on industry-specific accounting
standards. The second shortcoming of Cohen et al.’s (2013) ability measure is that it does not
capture intangible capital investments that result in cost savings. Their measure of ability is based
on how successful a firm is at converting intangible capital investments into future sales growth.
But cost savings ultimately affect the present value of a firm’s future cash flows, and thus should
be considered in a measure of ability. I account for this by constructing my ability measure to
reflect how SG&A spending intensity translates into future gross profit growth, instead of future
sales growth.
Using this modified measure of ability at investing in intangible capital (also referred to in
this paper as “SG&A spending ability”), I estimate whether firms that have a high ability at
investing in intangible capital and invest heavily in this area experience significant positive
abnormal stock returns. I follow Cohen et al.’s (2013) approach for sorting firms into portfolios,
but I classify firms into portfolios based on my SG&A spending ability measure and a firm’s
SG&A intensity instead of R&D spending ability and R&D intensity. I place my most effective
investors (high ability and high intensity) in the “GoodSG&A” portfolio and ineffective investors
(low ability and high intensity) in the “BadSG&A” portfolio. I also create a hedge portfolio that
takes a long position in the GoodSG&A portfolio and a short position in the BadSG&A portfolio.

5

To identify whether investors correctly value firms that are effective at investing in
intangible capital, I perform a calendar-time portfolio analysis using 40 years of past monthly stock
data on each of my portfolios. I calculate four-factor alphas (Carhart 1997), and five-factor alphas
(Fama and French 2016) for each of the portfolios to determine their abnormal returns. I find that
the GoodSG&A portfolio earns significant positive abnormal returns when using the multifactor
models: the equal-weighted GoodSG&A portfolio has a Carhart four-factor and Fama/French fivefactor alpha of 68 (t = 4.023, p < 0.001) and 68 basis points per month (t = 3.868, p < 0.001),
respectively, which both translate to annual abnormal returns of roughly 8.5%. Meanwhile, the
value-weighted GoodSG&A portfolio have four- and five-factor alphas of 24 (t = 1.428, p = 0.154)
and 20 basis points per month (t = 1.176, p = 0.241), respectively, indicating that investors more
accurately price the larger firms than the smaller firms in this portfolio. Nevertheless, these results
still indicate that, on average, a firm that demonstrates high effectiveness at investing in intangible
capital will experience statistically significant positive abnormal returns. In contrast, the
BadSG&A portfolio does not experience strong significant abnormal returns. The equal-weighted
BadSG&A portfolio have four- and five-factor alphas of 29 (t = 1.975 p = 0.049) and 26 basis
points per month (t = 1.696, p = 0.091). Likewise, the value-weighted BadSG&A portfolio have
four- and five-factor alphas of 1 (t = 0.076, p = 0.940) and -18 basis points per month (t = -1.063,
p = 0.289). These results indicate that the larger firms seem to experience lower risk-adjusted
returns than the smaller firms in the BadSG&A portfolio. Lastly, the equal- and value-weighted
hedge portfolios have five-factor alphas of 41 basis points per month (t = 2.180, p = 0.030) and 39
basis points per month (t = 1.641, p = 0.102), respectively.
Additionally, I try to replicate the findings of Cohen et al.’s (2013) study using updated
data, as it was the inspiration for my empirical approach. Using monthly stock data from July 1980
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to June 2020, I ran a calendar-time portfolio analysis employing their original measure for firmlevel R&D spending ability and R&D spending intensity. I also ran another portfolio analysis using
a model for R&D spending ability that depends on gross profit growth instead of sales growth, to
account for potential cost savings that result from R&D activity. Using updated data, sorting firms
into portfolios based on Cohen et al.’s (2013) original measure for R&D spending ability and
spending intensity, and calculating Carhart four-factor alphas (as done in Cohen et al. 2013), I find
little indication that firms in the equal- and value-weighted BadR&D and GoodR&D portfolios
earn abnormal returns. Essentially, I am unable to replicate the findings of Cohen et al.’s (2013)
paper using updated data. When I sort firms using my measure for R&D spending ability that
depends on gross profit growth, I find that firms in the equal- and value-weighted GoodR&D
portfolios have both large and significant abnormal returns. The equal-weighted GoodR&D
portfolio has four- and five-factor alphas of 133 (t = 3.327, p < 0.001) and 122 basis points per
month (t = 2.983, p = 0.003), respectively. Additionally, my value-weighted GoodR&D portfolio
has four and five-factor alphas of 79 (t = 1.990, p = 0.047) and 82 basis points per month (t =
2.068, p = 0.039). Using the five-factor alphas, these translate to annual returns of 15.7% and
10.3%, respectively. However, I find that the number of stocks in this GoodR&D portfolio is well
below the 30-stock minimum (as suggested by Statman 1987) to be considered a well-diversified
portfolio. Thus, it’s unclear if the abnormal returns experienced by these portfolios are due to firmspecific idiosyncratic shocks or the variables that I used for the sorts (i.e., R&D spending ability
and R&D intensity).
The rest of my paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3 explains the data and my measure for SG&A spending ability. Section 4 describes the empirical
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approach that I use in my analysis. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 presents additional
results. Finally, Section 7 summarizes my findings and its implications.

2 Literature Review
This paper extends previous research on the impact of firms’ investments in intangible
capital (also known as “intangible assets”) on firm value. According to Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), firms cannot capitalize investments in intangible assets on their
balance sheet. Instead, all investments in intangibles must be expensed in the current year –usually
under sales, general and administrative (SG&A) or in separate subcategories such as research and
development (R&D) and advertising. Eisfeldt et al. (2021) observe how intangible assets are
largely absent from traditional measures of firm value despite their growing importance in firms’
capital stocks. Multiple studies, including those conducted by Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013b),
Falato et al. (2013), Belo et al. (2019), and Ewens et al. (2020) estimate that intangible capital on
average comprises approximately half of firm value, with variation from this mean depending on
industry factors, such as the labor skill-level and consumer product orientation. Belo et al. (2021)
find that the two primary categories of intangible capital, knowledge capital and brand capital,
account for 20-43% and 6-25% of firm value, respectively. All else equal, the estimated firm-value
decomposition is largely explained by how costly it is to adjust inputs to changing economic
conditions, with more valuable types of capital being those with higher adjustment costs.
Additionally, with GAAP not requiring the value of intangible assets to be reported on firms’
financial statements, several researchers, including Chan et al. (2001) and Eisfeldt et al. (2021)
have underscored how these rules complicate the process of equity valuation.
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Many researchers including Chan et al. (2001), Eberhart et al. (2004), Joshi and Hanssens
(2004), Daniel and Titman (2006), Cohen et al. (2013), and Oh et al. (2016) have investigated
whether investors fail to correctly value firms’ investments in intangible assets. A consistent
failure to correctly value investments in intangible capital should result in abnormal equity returns,
which are the unexpected returns from a company’s stock after controlling for well-studied risk
factors. Under the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices always fully reflect information about
the risk and underlying value of intangible assets. Thus, there is no room for investors to make
abnormal returns by investing in firms who invest heavily in intangible capital. However, several
studies (mentioned below) show that stock prices consistently and predictably misvalue the impact
of investments in intangible assets on firm value. Joshi and Hanssens (2004) find a positive and
long run impact of advertising spending on market capitalization, and Chan et al. (2001) and Oh
et al. (2016) find that firms’ investments in brand capital are persistently undervalued by investors:
advertising expenditures consistently lead to positive abnormal returns. Chan et al. (2001) find that
firms in the highest advertising spending quintile have an average abnormal return of 3.1% per
year. Oh et al. (2016) replicate the findings of Chan et al. (2001) using updated data and find that
the abnormal annual returns can be as much as 9% in industries where brand capital is relatively
more important, such as consumer goods and consumer services.
There are also several studies (mentioned below) that have found that investors consistently
misvalue firms’ investments in intangible capital through R&D, otherwise known as knowledge
capital. Daniel and Titman (2006) argue that investors overvalue the impact of investments in
knowledge capital on firm value. However, some evidence indicate that investors underestimate
the firm value generated from R&D activity. For example, Chan et al. (2001) find that firms that
have high R&D expenditures relative to equity value tend to significantly outperform firms with a
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low intensity: these firms have a 6.12% average annual abnormal return over the following three
years. Meanwhile Eberhart et al. (2004) find that large, unexpected increases in R&D expenditures
predict significant positive abnormal stock returns.
Most previous research study the relationship between abnormal returns and the intensity
of investments in intangible assets. Meanwhile, little research examines the relationship between
firm ability at generating intangible capital and abnormal stock returns. Ability at intangible capital
creation can be defined as a firm’s effectiveness at converting intangible capital investments into
something that the firm values. This is an important area of research because many investments in
intangible assets fail to generate any value because of factors such as mistiming, poor forecasting,
or budget constraints. Thus, some firms that invest equally in intangible capital can have quite
divergent results. Multiple studies, including Chan et al. (2001) and Cohen et al. (2013), find that
the raw excess returns of firms that invest heavily in R&D are not significantly different than firms
that invest little to none in R&D. Accounting for firms’ ability to make successful intangible capital
investments along with how much they spend on such investments could possibly reveal new and
undetected patterns on investors’ misvaluation of the impact of firms’ investments in intangible
assets. The research that has tried to address this concern has been focused on R&D spending
rather than advertising spending or SG&A spending more broadly. This is due to the appeal that
R&D spending can be used as a measure of companies’ innovation efforts. Hirschleifer et al.
(2010) find that firm-level innovative efficiency, measured as patents or citations scaled by
research and development expenditures, is a strong positive predictor of future returns after
controlling for firm characteristics and risks.
My approach to measuring firm-level ability at investing in intangible capital most closely
relates to that of Cohen et al. (2013), who develop another simple, yet very compelling method to
10

compute firms’ ability to generate intangible assets through R&D spending by looking at which
firms do best at translating R&D intensity into future sales growth. In addition to designing a
rigorous empirical approach, Cohen et al. (2013) use a more detectable output measure compared
to patents, because many firms who successfully invest in knowledge capital never file for patents.
Also, the value of patents, which are not reported by firms, vary substantially. Arundel and Kabla
(1998) estimate that less than 40% of firms file patents for their technological breakthroughs.
Using past financial and stock return data, Cohen et al. (2013) find an equal- and value-weighted
portfolio of firms that have high R&D spending ability and high R&D intensity earn four-factor
alphas of 90 (t = 3.11) and 78 basis points per month (t = 2.27), respectively. This translates to
annual abnormal returns of 11% and 9.8%.
My research differs from Cohen et al. (2013) and others for two reasons. First, instead of
limiting my focus to R&D expenditures, I use SG&A expenditures to construct my ability measure
and to track intangible capital investment intensity. Koh and Reeb (2015) find that a substantial
number of publicly traded firms in the US fail to separately provide any information regarding
their corporate R&D efforts, despite evidence that these firms still invest in projects that generate
knowledge capital. These same researchers also note that there exist different industry standards
for reporting R&D expenditures because GAAP rules leave considerable discretion among firm
managers as to what can be classified as an R&D expense.1 Eisfeldt et al. (2021) argue that using
100% of SG&A instead of relying on separately reported R&D, advertising, and other nonproduction related expenses is the most reliable way to track intangible capital formation.

1

In Compustat, R&D and advertising expenses are included in SG&A expense as XSGA.
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The second way that my research differs from previous studies is that my ability measure
is meant to capture how intangible capital investments convert into future gross profit growth,
instead of future sales growth as in Cohen et al.’s (2013) study or patent and citation counts as in
Hirshleifer et al.’s (2010) paper. As previously mentioned, most firms fail to file patents even for
successful investments in intangible assets, so using patents as an outcome variable could
undercount the number of firms that have a high ability at converting investments into financial
success. Meanwhile using sales growth as an outcome variable assumes that investments in
intangible capital are purely revenue-generating. However, intangible capital investments could
also result in cost-savings. For example, a company could spend money on a new piece of software
that reduces the costs associated with selling its products. By using sales growth as the dependent
variable to calculate firm ability, Cohen et al. (2013) may have failed to account for the firms who
achieved cost savings from their investments in intangible assets. Cohen et al. (2013) may have
also overcounted the number of firms that generated additional revenue from their intangible
capital investments but failed to generate any significant value because their investments resulted
in an increase in the costs of selling their products or services. By using gross profit growth as an
outcome variable when determining ability at investing in intangible capital, I account for the fact
that investments in intangible capital can be revenue-generating as well as cost saving, both of
which are equally valuable to a company.

3 Data and Summary Statistics
I obtain data on monthly stock returns, share prices, shares outstanding, and miscellaneous
security information (i.e., exchange codes, share codes, etc.) from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) and firm-specific accounting data such as gross profits, selling and general
administrative (SG&A) expenses, etc., from Compustat over a period from January 1962 to
12

December 2020.2 As in previous stock market anomalies research, such as that conducted by
Cohen et al. (2013) and Oh et al. (2016), my sample includes all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
common stocks (CRSP exchange codes 1-3 and share codes 10-12). Because of their unique
characteristics, I exclude real estate investment trusts, close-ended funds, and non-US firms that
trade in the United States (CRRP share codes >12). Additionally, my sample only includes
common stocks with valid (i.e., non-missing) SG&A intensity and SG&A spending ability
estimates, which I define below, for each year. The SG&A variable from Compustat (i.e., labeled
with the mnemonic xsga) includes all non-direct business costs, such as advertising and R&D
expenses, even when broken out separately from SG&A in a firm’s accounting records.3 As
mentioned above, researchers argue (see Eisfeldt et al. 2021) that using 100% of SG&A instead of
calculating total intangible capital investments by summing R&D, advertising, and other nonproduction related expenses is the most reliable way to track intangible capital investments.
Table 1 shows that, over my July 1980 to June 2020 sample period, I analyze a larger
sample than used by Cohen et al. (2013), whose sample only includes a subset of firms that
voluntarily report R&D separately from SG&A. Koh and Reeb (2015) find that a substantial
number of firms fail to report R&D spending, despite evidence of innovation activity. In my
sample of 21,000+ firms with common stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (which I label
as “CRSP Universe”), only 54% of them report R&D spending. Meanwhile, over 89% of these

2

I initially draw on a larger sample size than used in my portfolio analysis to allow for a sufficient back window to

compute my SG&A spending ability measure.

3

For more information on what other non-direct business costs are included under xsga, visit Compustat’s

Fundamentals Annual data dictionary at https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/get-data/center-researchsecurity-prices-crsp/annual-update/crspcompustat-merged/fundamentals-annual/.
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firms report SG&A spending. My sample is smaller than the CRSP Universe because, as
mentioned above, I only analyze firms that have valid SG&A intensity and SG&A spending ability
estimates in a given year. Despite a substantial number of firms reporting SG&A spending, 11%
of firms in the CRSP Universe never report a valid SG&A expenditure (or fail to consistently
report the expenditure) so they are excluded from my sample. Additionally, many stocks in the
CRSP Universe do not have enough past data to calculate a valid estimate for SG&A spending
ability. As described below, to calculate SG&A spending ability I use eight years of past data but
require at least 75% of SG&A intensity values to be non-missing for each firm-level regression.
Given this constraint, I essentially need a stock to have at least six years of past, valid data in my
July 1980 to June 2020 sample period to generate its annual SG&A spending ability score. Many
companies are in my sample period for less than the required time to generate a valid SG&A
spending ability estimate, either because they are delisted from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
or they are listed near the end of my sample period.
Table 1: Sample comparison
My Sample
# of observations
# of distinct stocks

99,920
9,555

Cohen et al. (2013)
Sample
45,105
4,319

CRSP Universe
213,434
21,538

This table reports the number of observations (i.e., annual fundamental data for a given firm) and the number of
distinct stocks across the different samples considered in my analysis (i.e., unique CRSP permno codes). The CRSP
Universe is simply a collection of all annual fundamental data for common stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ from my July 1980 to June 2020 sample period. “My Sample” is a subset of the CRSP Universe sample
with valid (i.e., non-missing) SG&A intensity and SG&A spending ability estimates for a given observation. “Cohen
et al. (2013) Sample” is a subset of the CRSP Universe sample with valid R&D intensity and R&D spending ability
estimates for a given observation.

My measure of ability at investing in intangible capital is based on the same framework as
Cohen et al. (2013). Namely, my ability measure is meant to capture simply how good a firm is at
converting investments in intangible capital into something it values. However, while Cohen et
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al.’s (2013) measure for R&D spending ability captures how successful a firm is at converting
R&D spending intensity into future sales growth, my ability measure captures how a firm’s SG&A
intensity translates into future gross profit growth. As mentioned above, the benefits of my
measure compared to Cohen et al.’s (2013) is that it (1) can be applied to a larger sample because
virtually all firms report SG&A spending and (2) recognizes that cost savings resulting from
intangible capital investments are valuable to a firm.
In constructing my model for SG&A spending ability, one concern that I consider is the
time horizon used to match SG&A intensity to future gross profit growth. When examining the
translated effects of advertising spending on future stock returns, Oh et al. (2016) use a 12-month
lag. Meanwhile, Chan et al. (2001) and Eberhart et al. (2004) use a three-year lag when analyzing
the effect of R&D spending on future stock returns. There is no general consensus on the time
horizon. Thus, I design my measure of SG&A spending ability to account for potential time
horizon differences. I use up to a five-year lag in measuring the impact of SG&A intensity on
future gross profit growth.
I compute a company’s SG&A spending ability for a given year by running rolling firmby-firm regressions of firm-level gross profit growth (defined as log( GPt / GPt-1 )) on the log of
lagged SG&A intensity (defined as log( 1 + SG&At-j / Salest-j ), where j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). I run
separate regressions for five different lags of SG&A (i.e., SG&A from years t – 1, t – 2, t – 3, t –
4, and t – 5); I then take the average of the five regression coefficients on SG&A intensity (defined
as γ𝑗 ) as my measure of SG&A spending ability. Equations 1 and 2 exhibit how my ability measure
is calculated.
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log (

𝐺𝑃𝑖 | 𝑡
) = γ0 + γ𝑗 log(1 + 𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝑖 | 𝑡−𝑗 /𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 | 𝑡−𝑗 ) + ϵ𝑖 | 𝑡 , 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5
𝐺𝑃𝑖 | 𝑡−1

SG&A Spending Ability =

γ1 + γ2 + γ3 + γ4 + γ5
5

(1)

(2)

Cohen et al. (2013) examine a variety of different model specifications for calculating
R&D spending ability, such as running a single regression for each firm’s sales growth on the
average of the past five years of R&D intensity and using this single coefficient as a measure of
ability. However, they find a specification like the one displayed in equations 1 and 2 to work just
as well as these other specifications, so they use it as their main model.
To estimate each firm’s SG&A spending ability, for every firm in each year I use eight
years of past data for every firm-level regression. I then run these regressions on a rolling basis
each year using the prior eight years of data. I require a minimum of 75% non-missing SG&A
intensity observations and that over half the SG&A intensity observations are positive for each
firm-level regression; otherwise, I set the slope coefficients to missing values. Table 2 presents
full-sample summary statistics of my SG&A spending ability measure. The average ability
estimate is 0.704 while the median is 0.413, indicating that the distribution of ability estimates is
positively skewed. Additionally, the average future gross profit growth among companies in my
sample is 5.20% and on average SG&A expenditures comprise 23.8% of sales.
Table 2: Summary statistics of ability, SG&A intensity, and gross profit growth
Variable
SG&A Spending Ability
log(1+SG&At-j/Salest-j)
log(GPt/GPt-1)

Mean
.700
.238
.056

Median
0.409
0.208
0.068

Std. Dev.
7.73
.197
.382

This table reports pooled summary statistics for SG&A spending ability, SG&A intensity, and gross profit growth for
stocks in “My Sample” (see Table 2’s description for more information on how “My Sample” is determined). SG&A
spending ability is calculated for each firm in a given year by running separate time series regressions using five
different lags of SG&A. I then take the simple average of the five different regression coefficients of SG&A intensity
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to calculate my ability measure:
log (

𝐺𝑃𝑖 | 𝑡
) = γ0 + γ𝑗 log(1 + 𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝑖 | 𝑡−𝑗 /𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 | 𝑡−𝑗 ) + ϵ𝑖 | 𝑡 , 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5
𝐺𝑃𝑖 | 𝑡−1
SG&A Spending Ability =

γ1 + γ2 + γ3 + γ4 + γ5
5

A back window of 6-8 years of non-missing data is required to compute a regression coefficient for SG&A spending
ability.

4 Empirical Approach
In this section, I introduce my empirical approach for identifying whether investors
misvalue firms that are effective at investing in intangible capital. I define effectiveness using a
firm’s SG&A spending ability estimate and its SG&A intensity: a firm with high SG&A spending
ability and high SG&A intensity is considered effective at investing in intangible capital.
Conversely, a firm who scores low in SG&A spending ability but spends a relatively large amount
on SG&A would not be considered effective. Again, a consistent failure by investors to correctly
value these firms that take advantage of their high ability should reveal itself through abnormal
equity returns. This is because under the efficient market hypothesis, there is no room for investors
to make abnormal returns if all available information about a firm is priced into its stock. As
highlighted by Fama and French (2008), there are two approaches that are commonly used to
identify anomalies. The first, is to perform a calendar-time portfolio analysis, sorting on anomaly
variables (in my case, SG&A intensity and the SG&A spending ability measure that I feature in
my analysis), and regressing portfolio returns on well-studied risk factors to estimate its alphas.
The second method is to employ monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions
of average returns on anomaly variables. In this paper, I will be using the first approach given its
wide popularity in anomaly research and its recognized advantages: it gives a simple picture of
how average returns vary across the spectrum of sorts on anomaly variables.
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I form portfolios through double sorts using the methodology of Fama and French (2016) and
Cohen et al. (2013). The portfolios only contain stocks with positive SG&A intensity and nonmissing ability estimates. First, a firm is sorted into one of three portfolios based on its SG&A
intensity.
•

SG&AHigh Portfolio: Stocks in the top 30th percentile of SG&A intensity

•

SG&ALow Portfolio: Stocks in the bottom 30th percentile of SG&A intensity

•

SG&AMid Portfolio: Stocks that are in neither the portfolios are defined above

Next, a firm is sorted into another one of three portfolios based on its SG&A spending ability
score, as described above.
•

AbilityHigh Portfolio: Stocks in the top 20th percentile of SG&A spending ability

•

AbilityLow Portfolio: Stocks in the bottom 20th percentile of SG&A spending ability

Finally, stocks are then sorted into quintiles from the intersection of the SG&A intensity and
ability sorts described above, giving me six portfolios. The SG&A intensity and SG&A spending
ability estimates used to form the portfolios are from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t – 1
from July to December and calendar year t – 2 from January to June (as in Fama and French 2016
and Cohen et al. 2013).
To examine the relationship between SG&A spending ability, SG&A intensity, and abnormal
returns, I analyze three portfolios. The first portfolio takes a long position in the stocks that are in
the intersection of the SG&AHigh and AbilityHigh sub-portfolios, which I label as the “GoodSG&A”
portfolio. In other words, these are firms that exhibit high ability at investing in intangible capital
in the past and invest a large amount in this area. The second portfolio takes a long position in the
portfolio that is the intersection of the SG&AHigh and AbilityLow sub-portfolios, which I label as
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the “BadSG&A” portfolio. This portfolio comprises firms that exhibit a low ability at investing in
intangible capital in the past, yet still invest a large amount in this area. The third portfolio is a
hedged portfolio that takes a long position in the GoodSG&A portfolio and a short position in the
BadSG&A portfolio, which I label as the “Spread” portfolio.
It is possible that any abnormal returns earned by each of the portfolios described above reflect
risk differentials contained in the variables that I sorted on to construct the portfolios. To check
for this possibility, I compute the four- and five-factor alphas (as in Carhart 1997 and Fama and
French 2016) for each of my three portfolios, by running two time series regressions. To compute
the four-factor alphas, I run time series regressions of excess portfolio returns on the market
(MKT), Size (SMB), Value (HML), and Momentum (UMD) factor returns, as displayed in
equation 3. Likewise, to compute the five-factor alphas, I run time series regressions of excess
portfolio returns on the market (MKT), Size (SMB), Value (HML), Profitability (RMW), and
Investment (CMA) factor returns, as displayed in equation 4. Table 3 defines the key variables and
describes the data sources.

𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝑠SM𝐵𝑡 + ℎHM𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡

(3)

𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝑠SM𝐵𝑡 + ℎHM𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟RM𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐CM𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡

(4)

Table 3: Variable definitions of five-factor factor model
Variable
𝑹𝒕

Definition
Monthly portfolio raw return

Data Sources
CRSP

𝑹𝑭𝒕

Risk free return

Kenneth French’s Data library

𝑹𝑴𝒕

The return on the value-weighted portfolio Kenneth French’s Data library
of NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks
SMB (Small Minus Big) is the return on a Kenneth French’s Data library
diversified portfolio of small stocks minus

𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕
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𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕

𝑹𝑴𝑾𝒕

𝑪𝑴𝑨𝒕

𝑼𝑴𝑫𝒕

the return on a diversified portfolio of big
stocks
HML (High Minus Low) is the difference
between the returns on diversified
portfolios of high and low Book/Market
stocks
RMW (Robust Minus Weak) is the
difference between the returns on
diversified portfolios of stocks with robust
and weak profitability
CMA (Conservative Minus Aggressive) is
the difference between the returns on
diversified portfolios of the stocks of low
and high investment firms
UMD (Up Minus Down) is the difference
between the returns on diversified
portfolios with high prior returns and low
prior returns

Kenneth French’s Data library

Kenneth French’s Data library

Kenneth French’s Data library

Kenneth French’s Data library

5 Results
Panels A and B of Table 4 report alphas for the equal-weighted and value-weighted yearly
portfolio sorts, respectively. There is strong indication that, on average, stocks that exhibit a high
ability at investing in intangible capital and spend heavily in this area (which I include in the
GoodSG&A portfolio) experience positive and significant abnormal monthly returns. Panel A of
Table 4 shows that the equal-weighted GoodSG&A portfolio has four- and five-factor alphas of
68 (t = 4.023, p < 0.001) and 68 basis points per month (t = 3.868, p < 0.001), which both translate
to annual abnormal returns of roughly 8.5%. Meanwhile, Panel B indicates that the value-weighted
GoodSG&A portfolio has four- and five-factor alphas of 24 (t = 1.428, p = 0.154) and 20 basis
points (t = 1.176, p = 0.241), which translates to annual abnormal returns of 2.9% and 2.4%,
respectively. The difference in results between the equal- and value-weighted portfolios shows
that large cap stocks experience lower abnormal returns than small cap stocks in the GoodSG&A
portfolio. This is likely because large stocks get more attention from investors and are better priced
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to reflect all publicly available information about these companies’ effectiveness at investing in
intangible capital. Nonetheless, it is still clear from the alphas of the equal-weighted GoodSG&A
portfolio that, on average, companies that are highly effective at investing in intangible capital
experience positive and significant abnormal returns.
While there is strong indication that firms in the GoodSG&A portfolio on average
experience positive abnormal returns, there is low indication that stocks that exhibit low ability at
investing in intangible capital yet spend heavily in this area (which I include in the BadSG&A
portfolio) experience abnormal monthly returns. The four- and five-factor alphas for the equaland value-weighted portfolios not only vary between positive and negative depending on how they
are weighted, but both types of portfolios are also not statistically significant.
Because of the high alphas for the equal-weighted GoodSG&A portfolio, the four- and
five-factor alpha for the equal-weighted long-short portfolio (which I label “Spread” and is the
difference in returns between the GoodSG&A and BadSG&A portfolios) are also positive and
statistically significant (at the 5% significance level). Table 4 shows that the four- and five-factor
alphas of the equal-weighted long-short portfolio are 38 (t = 2.067, p = 0.040) and 41 basis points
per month (t = 2.180, p = 0.030).
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Table 4: Monthly abnormal returns for portfolios
BadSG&A (Low
Ability x SG&Ahigh)
Panel A: Equalweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat
Panel B: Valueweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat

GoodSG&A (High
Ability x SG&Ahigh)

Spread (GoodSG&A
– BadSG&A)

0.0029
1.975
0.0026
1.696

0.0068
4.023
0.0068
3.868

0.0038
2.067
0.0041
2.180

0.0001
0.076
-0.0018
-1.063

0.0024
1.428
0.0020
1.176

0.0023
0.993
0.0039
1.641

This table reports monthly portfolio returns for double sorts on SG&A spending ability and SG&A intensity. The
SG&A spending ability estimate used to form the portfolios is the ability estimate from the fiscal year ending in
calendar year t – 1 from July to December and calendar year t – 2 from January to June. The value-weight portfolios
are weighted by the firms’ market capitalization at the end of June in fiscal year t – 1 (the month before the portfolios
are reconstructed). The weight is held constant through the entirety of the one-year holding period. Four-factor alphas
are calculated by taking the intercept coefficient (𝛼) from the following time series regression (as in Carhart 1997):

𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝑠SM𝐵𝑡 + ℎHM𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡
Five-factor alphas are calculated by taking the intercept coefficient (𝛼) from the following time series regression (as
in Fama and French 2016):

𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝑠SM𝐵𝑡 + ℎHM𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟RM𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐CM𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡
The sample period is July 1980 to June 2020.

Table 5 presents additional characteristics of the portfolios based on the five-factor model
(as in Fama and French 2016). The five-factor loadings in Table 5 suggest that the GoodSG&A
and BadSG&A portfolios both have positive loadings on size and negative loadings on
profitability, while the BadSG&A portfolio has an additional negative loading on value. These
results indicate that the GoodSG&A portfolio favors small, unprofitable stocks, while the
BadSG&A portfolio favors small, unprofitable stocks with high book-to-market ratios. Both
portfolios have a coefficient of roughly 1 on the market factor indicating that their volatility mirrors
the overall market. Meanwhile, the Spread portfolio only has a negative loading on profitability,
indicating that stocks in this portfolio are typically unprofitable.
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Table 5: Equal-weighted portfolios’ five-factor loadings

𝑏
𝑡(𝑏)
𝑠
𝑡(𝑠)
ℎ
𝑡(ℎ)
𝑟
𝑡(𝑟)
𝑐
𝑡(𝑐)
𝑅2

BadSG&A (Low
Ability x SG&Ahigh)
1.000
26.79
0.737
13.25
0.143
2.154
-0.302
-4.289
-0.005
-0.046

GoodSG&A (High
Ability x SG&Ahigh)
1.001
23.62
0.850
13.45
0.001
0.017
-0.482
-6.032
-0.075
-0.624

Spread (GoodSG&A
– BadSG&A)
0.001
0.028
0.112
1.634
-0.142
-1.726
-0.180
-2.070
-0.070
-0.536

0.756

0.744

0.051

This table presents the five-factor loadings for the equal-weighted portfolios. The factor loadings are the regression
coefficients of the Fama-French five-factor model:
𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝑠SM𝐵𝑡 + ℎHM𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟RM𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐CM𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡
See Table 3 for a description of the different factors in the model (i.e., SMB, HML, etc.)

Tables 6 and 7 display the top eight longest-held company stocks in the BadSG&A and
GoodSG&A portfolios, respectively, and the GICS designated sub-industry for each company.
Based on these tables, there seems to be some evidence of persistence in firm-level SG&A
spending ability, with some companies remaining in either of the portfolios for over 10+ years.
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Table 6: Longest holding Stocks in BadSG&A portfolio
Company Name

Number of Years in BadSG&A
Portfolio

Sub-Industry

14

Life Sciences Tools &
Services

14

Publishing

13

Research & Consulting
Services

HAVERTY FURNITURE

13

Home furnishing Retail

MEDTRONIC PLC

12

Health Care Equipment

FLUKE CORP

11

Electronic Equipment &
Instruments

PALL CORP

11

Industrial Machinery

AVON PRODUCTS

10

Personal Products

MILLIPORE CORP
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS
-CL A
FORRESTER
RESEARCH INC

This table reports the top eight longest held stocks in the BadSG&A portfolio. To calculate the number of years held,
I look at the BadSG&A portfolio construction over my July 1980 to June 2020 sample period, group the stocks in the
sample by their corresponding CRSP permno code, and count the number of observations. The sub-industry of each
firm corresponds to the sub-industry code ascribed by the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).

Table 7: Longest holding stocks in GoodSG&A portfolio
Company Name
LAWSON PRODUCTS

Number of Years in GoodSG&A
Sub-Industry
Portfolio
Trading Companies &
12
Distributors

PFIZER INC

11

US CELLULAR CORP

9

BIO-RAD
LABORATORIES INC
BRISTOL-MYERS
SQUIBB CO

8

Pharmaceuticals
Wireless Telecommunication
Services
Life Sciences Tools &
Services

8

Pharmaceuticals

URBAN ONE INC

8

Broadcasting

CCUR HOLDING INC

7

Specialized Finance

EBAY INC

7

Internet & Direct Marketing
Retail

This table reports the top eight longest held stocks in the GoodSG&A portfolio. See the description of Table 6 to see
how the number of years held and the sub-industry are found.
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Tables 8 and 9 show the most common industry groups for the companies in the BadSG&A
and GoodSG&A portfolios, respectively. Interestingly, we see that the five most common industry
groups are the same (yet in different rank order) for both the BadSG&A and GoodSG&A
portfolios. The most common industry groups are unsurprisingly those that one would associate
with high spending on research and development activities (Technology Hardware & Equipment,
Health Care Equipment & Services, Software & Services) as well as advertising and marketing
activities (Retailing, Banks).
Table 8: Most common industry groups in BadSG&A portfolio
Industry Group
Technology Hardware & Equipment
Banks
Retailing
Health Care Equipment & Services
Software & Services

Number of Companies by Industry Group
Over Sample Period (Not Distinct)
358
286
262
256
233

This table reports the five most common industry groups (as ascribed by GICS) of the stocks in the BadSG&A
portfolio over my sample period. To calculate the number of companies by industry group, I look at the BadSG&A
portfolio construction over my sample period, group stocks in my sample by their GICS designated industry group
code, and count the number of observations.

Table 9: Most common industry groups in GoodSG&A portfolio
Industry Group
Technology Hardware & Equipment
Software & Services
Health Care Equipment & Services
Retailing
Banks

Number of Companies by Industry Group
Over Sample Period (Not Distinct)
255
197
147
133
115

This table reports the five most common industry groups of the stocks in the GoodSG&A portfolio over my sample
period. See Table 8’s description to understand how to find the most common industry groups.

Figure 1 displays how the number of stocks in the GoodSG&A and BadSG&A portfolios
vary across time. The number of stocks in each of the portfolios is influenced by the distribution
of firms sorted on the intersection of their SG&A spending ability and SG&A intensity estimates.
Figure 1 shows that on average the number of stocks in the BadSG&A portfolio over my sample
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period is higher than the number of stocks in the GoodSG&A portfolio (68 vs. 45). This indicates
that the distribution of firms based on the intersection of their SG&A spending ability and intensity
estimates is right skewed. Consequently, the returns of the GoodSG&A portfolio are slightly more
sensitive to the returns of individual stocks relative to the BadSG&A portfolio.
Figure 1: Size of BadSG&A and GoodSG&A portfolios over time

This figure presents a time series of the number of companies in the BadSG&A and GoodSG&A portfolios as well as
the average number of companies in each of the portfolios over my July 1980 to June 2020 sample period.

6 Additional findings
For robustness, I construct another measure of SG&A spending ability by analyzing how a
firm’s SG&A intensity translates into future sales growth, instead of future gross profit growth. I
find that the abnormal returns of the GoodSG&A portfolio constructed using this other measure
of SG&A spending ability are weaker in magnitude and significance than the GoodSG&A
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portfolio constructed using future gross profit growth as the dependent variable in the model for
SG&A spending ability.
The alphas of these portfolios are reported in Panels A and B of Table 10. The four- and fivefactor alphas for the equal-weighted GoodSG&A portfolio constructed using an ability measure
based on sales growth are 38 (t = 2.640, p = 0.009) and 34 (t = 2.209, p = 0.028) basis points,
respectively, versus 68 (t = 4.023, p < 0.001) and 68 basis points per month (t = 3.868, p < 0.001)
for the equal-weighted GoodSG&A portfolio constructed using an ability measure based on gross
profit growth. Unlike the alphas for the equal-weighted BadSG&A portfolio using my original
measure for SG&A spending ability, the alphas of the equal-weighted BadSG&A alphas using a
measure based on future sales growth are also positive and statistically significant. The four- and
five-factor alphas for the equal-weighted BadSG&A portfolio constructed using an ability measure
based on sales growth are 35 (t = 2.751, p = 0.007) and 28 (t = 2.040, p = 0.042) basis points,
respectively, versus for the equal-weighted GoodSG&A portfolio constructed using an ability
measure based on gross profit growth. Given that both the BadSG&A and GoodSG&A portfolios
generate significant positive abnormal returns under this approach indicates that an SG&A
spending ability measure based on sales growth does a poor job at predicting abnormal returns.
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Table 10: Monthly abnormal returns for portfolios (defining ability based on future sales
growth)
BadSG&A (Low
Ability x SG&Ahigh)
Panel A: Equalweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat
Panel B: Valueweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat

GoodSG&A (High
Ability x SG&Ahigh)

Spread (GoodSG&A
– BadSG&A)

0.0035
2.751
0.0028
2.040

0.0038
2.640
0.0034
2.209

0.0003
0.186
0.0006
0.360

0.0015
1.031
-0.0008
-0.531

0.0023
1.319
0.0018
1.010

0.0007
0.334
0.0026
1.177

This table reports annual portfolio returns for double sorts on SG&A spending ability (defining ability on how well
SG&A spending intensity translates into future sales growth) and SG&A intensity. See Table 4’s description to see
how four- and five-factor alphas are calculated for each of the portfolios.

Given that I designed my empirical approach to closely mimic that of Cohen et al.’s (2013),
which finds that investors consistently undervalue firms that are effective R&D spenders, I also
see if Cohen et al.’s (2013) results still hold today using an updated sample size (July 1980 to June
2020) and sorting firms into portfolios based on their original R&D spending ability measure. I
also do another analysis using an updated sample size, but sort firms into portfolios based on an
R&D spending ability measure that depends on gross profit growth instead. I do this to determine
if R&D spending effectiveness is perhaps a better predictor of abnormal monthly returns than
SG&A spending effectiveness and to determine if an ability measure that depends on gross profit
growth instead of sales growth significantly influences the results. In addition to computing the
abnormal returns using Carhart four-factor alphas (as done in Cohen et al. 2013), I also compute
Fama/French five-factor alphas (as in Fama and French 2016), to determine if Cohen et al.’s (2013)
results may have been influenced by the factor model that they used.

28

Panels A and B of Table 11 report monthly alphas for the equal-weighted and valueweighted yearly portfolio sorts using R&D intensity and R&D spending ability that depends on
sales growth (as defined by Cohen et al. 2013). Based on these results, I find little indication that
firms in the BadR&D and GoodR&D portfolios formed under these portfolio sorts experience
significant abnormal returns. Both the equal- and value-weighted GoodR&D portfolios do not have
statistically significant alphas (at the 5% significance level). The equal-weighted BadR&D
portfolio has a five-factor alpha of 58 basis points (t = 2.179, p = 0.030), which is statistically
significant, but it does not have a statistically significant 4-factor alpha. Thus, this not a strong
indication that this portfolio experiences abnormal returns. Given that Cohen et al.’s (2013)
original paper found significant four-factor alphas for the equal- and value-weighted GoodR&D
and Spread portfolios using their 1980 to 2009 sample size, my results indicate that these
researcher’s findings no longer hold today.
Table 11: Monthly abnormal returns for R&D portfolios (defining ability based on future
sales growth)
BadR&D (Low
Ability x R&Dhigh)
Panel A: Equalweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat
Panel B: Valueweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat

GoodR&D (High
Ability x R&Dhigh)

Spread (GoodR&D –
BadR&D)

0.0049
1.879
0.0058
2.179

0.0059
1.552
0.0061
1.599

0.0009
0.220
0.0003
0.077

0.0002
0.062
0.0014
0.436

0.0013
0.324
0.0020
0.470

0.0011
0.227
0.0057
0.110

This table reports monthly portfolio returns for double sorts on R&D spending ability (defining ability on how well
R&D spending intensity translates into future sales growth) and R&D intensity. See Table 4’s description to see how
four- and five-factor alphas are calculated for each of the portfolios.
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Panels A and B of Table 12 report monthly alphas for the equal- and equity-weighted yearly
portfolio sorts using R&D intensity (as defined by Cohen et al. 2013) and an R&D spending ability
measure that depends on gross profit growth. The four- and five-factor alphas for the equal- and
value-weighted GoodR&D portfolio are both positive and statistically significant. The four- and
five-factor alphas for the equal-weighted GoodR&D portfolio are 133 (t = 3.327, p < 0.001) and
122 basis points per month (t = 2.983, p = 0.003). Meanwhile, the four- and five-factor alphas for
the value-weighted GoodR&D portfolio are 79 (t = 1.990, p = 0.048) and 82 basis points per month
(t = 2.068, p = 0.040). Using the monthly five-factor alphas, this translates to 15.7% and 10.3% of
abnormal annual returns for the equal- and value-weighted GoodR&D portfolio, respectively.
Given that the alphas of the equal-weighted GoodR&D portfolio are higher than the alphas of the
value-weighted portfolio suggest that the largest companies in the GoodR&D portfolio experience
lower abnormal returns than the smallest companies. I find little indication that the BadR&D
portfolio experience abnormal monthly returns. The four- and five-factor alphas for the BadR&D
equal- and value-weighted portfolios are not statistically significant.
Table 12: Monthly abnormal returns for portfolios (defining ability on R&D spending
intensity)
BadR&D (Low
Ability x R&Dhigh)
Panel A: Equalweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat
Panel B: Valueweighted portfolios
4-factor 𝛼
t-stat
5-factor 𝛼
t-stat

GoodR&D (High
Ability x R&Dhigh)

Spread (GoodR&D –
BadR&D)

0.0031
1.079
0.0044
1.517

0.0133
3.327
0.0122
2.983

0.0102
2.330
0.0075
1.732

0.0007
0.198
0.0024
0.721

0.0079
1.990
0.0082
2.068

0.0073
1.454
0.0075
1.525
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This table reports monthly portfolio returns for double sorts on R&D spending ability (defining ability on how well
R&D spending intensity translates into future gross profit growth) and R&D intensity. See Table 4’s description to
see how four- and five-factor alphas are calculated for each of the portfolios.

While the alphas of the GoodR&D portfolio are higher than the alphas of the GoodSG&A
portfolio (when they are equal-weighted), they are less statistically significant. Additionally,
Figure 2 shows that the number of firms in the GoodR&D portfolio are also significantly lower
than the number of firms in the GoodSG&A portfolio (as reported in Figure 1). The average
number of stocks in the GoodR&D portfolio during my sample period is 12, which is far below
the 30 minimum that Statman (1987) shows will create a well-diversified portfolio. Meanwhile,
the average number of stocks in the GoodSG&A portfolio is 45, which is well above 30. Thus, it’s
unclear if the abnormal returns experienced by the GoodR&D portfolio are due to firm-specific
risks or the variables that I used to sort stocks into portfolios (i.e., R&D spending ability and R&D
intensity). For this reason, I’m unable to conclude that R&D spending effectiveness is perhaps a
better predictor of abnormal monthly returns than SG&A spending effectiveness, with both ability
measures based on gross profit growth.

31

Figure 2: Size of BadR&D and GoodR&D portfolios over time

This figure presents a time series of the number of companies in the BadR&D and GoodR&D portfolios as well as the
average number of companies in each of the portfolios over my July 1980 to June 2020 sample period.

7 Conclusion
In this paper, I find that the market appears to consistently undervalue firms that are highly
effective at investing in intangible capital. Namely, using a sample of all NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ common stocks from July 1980 to June 2020, I find that firms that demonstrate a high
ability at investing in intangible capital and spend heavily in this area (which I define as effective
investing) experience significant positive abnormal returns after adjusting for well-studied risk
factors. This paper also proposes a novel method of measuring a firm’s ability at investing in
intangible capital, which can be applied to a larger sample of stocks than in previous market
anomaly studies and accounts for possible cost savings resulting from past intangible capital
investments. Cohen et al. (2013) define ability based on how intangible capital investments
32

translate into future sales growth, even though operating cost savings are a source of value for a
firm.
In employing this new measure of ability, an equal-weighted long portfolio strategy that
invests in firms that score in the top quintile of effectiveness earns abnormal returns of roughly
8.5% annually. Additionally, I seek to replicate the findings of Cohen et al.’s (2013) study using
updated data. Using monthly stock data from July 1980 to June 2020 (the same as my sample
range), I ran a calendar-time portfolio analysis employing their original measure for firm-level
R&D spending ability and R&D intensity. I also ran another portfolio analysis using a model for
R&D spending ability that depends on gross profit growth instead of sales growth, to account for
potential cost savings that result from R&D activity. Using updated data, sorting firms into
portfolios based on Cohen et al.’s (2013) original measure for R&D spending ability and R&D
intensity, and calculating Carhart four-factor alphas (as done in Cohen et al. 2013), I find little
indication that firms in the equal- and value-weighted BadR&D and GoodR&D portfolios earn
abnormal returns. Essentially, I am unable to replicate the findings of Cohen et al.’s (2013) paper
using updated data. When I sort firms using my measure for R&D spending ability that depends
on gross profit growth, I find that firms in the equal- and value-weighted GoodR&D portfolios
have both large and significant abnormal returns. However, I find that the number of stocks in the
GoodR&D portfolio is well below the minimum to be considered a well-diversified portfolio.
Thus, it’s unclear if the abnormal returns experienced by this portfolio are due to firm-specific
risks or the variables that I used for the sorts (i.e., R&D spending ability and R&D intensity).
The results that I present in this paper serve as evidence against the efficient market
hypothesis, which states that share prices reflect all information about a stock and that consistent
generation of abnormal returns is impossible. I demonstrate that I can build a portfolio based on
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two measures (i.e., SG&A intensity and SG&A spending ability), which can be easily computed
using publicly available data, and generate consistent, significant abnormal returns over a sample
period of 40 years. My findings are reason for equity analysts and fund managers to consider a
firm’s effectiveness at investing in intangible capital when setting price targets and making
investment decisions.
My empirical approach can be extended in a few ways to improve the robustness of my
findings. First, would be to employ monthly Fama/MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions to
further assess the predictive power of my measure for ability at investing in intangible capital. It
is recommended that any Fama/Macbeth cross sectional regressions follow the approach of Cohen
et al. (2013) and Hirshleifer et al. (2010) by controlling for well-known determinants of stock
returns like size, book-to-market, industry classification, etc. Second, would be to do two
additional calendar-time portfolio analyses sorting simply on SG&A intensity and separately on
SG&A spending ability. Cohen et al. (2013) did this as a robustness check in their paper but found
that the portfolios sorted simply on R&D spending ability and separately on R&D intensity did not
experience significant abnormal returns. However, my results from Table 10 indicate that sorting
simply on SG&A intensity may be a stronger predictor of abnormal stock returns than my SG&A
spending ability measure. Third, would be to alter my method for measuring intangible capital
investment ability to accommodate firms that have been recently (i.e., less than six years) publicly
listed. My method requires a firm to have at least six years of publicly available data on its SG&A
spending and gross profits to calculate an ability estimate. Because I’m unable to calculate ability
estimates for recently listed firms, this prevents me from including them in my portfolios.
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